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COMMENT
Free Speech and Anonymity: Louisiana's Increasing
Protection
1, INTRODUCTION
Anonymous writings have been important to American society since Colonial
times. In 1735, a colonial jury refused to convict John Peter Zenger for seditious
libel when he refused to reveal the author of anonymous political pamphlets
which he had printed.' The Federalist Papers, written by Alexander Hamilton,
James Madison, and John Jay to convince the people of the Colonies to ratify the
Constitution, were written under pseudonyms.2 As Justice Black noted in Talley
v. California,' we must remember that "[plersecuted groups and sects from time
to time throughout history have been able to criticize oppressive practices and
laws either anonymously or not at all."'4 This comment addresses two ways in
which The most protected sptetb, that v-wWkh cri1Acizes or concents governmnt
or its officials, has been historically limited.
First, Part II discusses libel suits brought by public officials. If large
numbers of libel suits filed by public officials were litigated, public officials
could effectively suppress criticism because newspapers, fearing lawsuits against
them, would be intimidated by the overwhelming legal costs involved.5
Therefore, any criticism of a public official would require absolute certainty as
to its truth before being published. The courts have limited the availability of
libel suits to public officials6 by use of the "actual malice" standard. The United
States Supreme Court most recently applied this standard in Harte-Hanks
Communication, Inc. v. Connaughton.7 In 1995, the Louisiana Supreme Court
confronted the same issue in Tarpley v. Colfax Chronicles and found that the
Copyright 1997, by LOUISIANA LAW REvIEW.
I. See James Alexander, A Brief Narrative of the Case and Trial of John Peter Zenger (Stanley
N. Katz ed. 1972).
2. The authors used the name Publius.
3. 362 U.S. 60, 80 S. Ct. 536 (1960).
4. Id. at 64, 80 S. Ct. at 538.
5. See Russell L. Weaver & Geoffrey Bennett, Is the New York Times "Actual Malice"
Standard Really Necessary? A Comparative Perspective, 53 La. L. Rev. 1153 (1993). See also Barr
v. Matteo, 360 U.S. 564, 79 S. Ct. 1335 (1959) (holding actual malice standard as applied to public
official defendants being sued by private individual plaintiffs necessary, because otherwise the threat
of damages would "inibit the fearless, vigorous, and effective administraion of poilicies of
government" Id. at 571, 79 S. Ct. at 1339).
6. "Public figures," private individuals who have "commanded a substantial amount of
independent public interest" or whose personality has entered "the 'vortex' of an important public
controversy," are also held to the actual malice standard in a libel suit. Curtis Publishing Co. v.
Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 87 S. Ct. 1975 (1967).
7. 491 U.S. 657, 109 S. Ct. 2678 (1989).
8. 650 So. 2d 738 (La. 1995).
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Louisiana Constitution provides greater protection for freedom of speech and the
press and the freedom to openly criticize our government and its officials than
does the United States Constitution. Part II focuses on the actual malice standard
and the way in which Louisiana's application of the standard evidences the
differing levels of protection between the First Amendment to the 'united States
Constitution and Article 1, section 5 of the Louisiana Constituion.
Second, Part III addresses the Louisiana Legislature's attempt to limit speech
within the realm of political debate with an outright ban on anonymous campaign
literature. State v. Moses9 held Louisiana Revised Statutes 18:1463(C)(3), which
prohibited the distribution of anonymous campaign literature, unconstitutional.
In Moses, the Louisiana Fourth Circuit Court of Appeal adopted the reasoning
of the United States Supreme Court case McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Commis-
sionl0 and buttressed its opinion with its own interpretation of the Louisiana
Constitution, which it viewed as granting greater protection for freedom of
speech than the United States Constitution.
I. THE "ACTUAL MALICE" STANDARD IN PUBLIC OFFICIAL LIBEL SUITS
A. Development of the "Actual Malice" Standard and the Use of Summary
Judgment
1. The United States Supreme Court Standard
In New York Times Company v. Sullivan," the United States Supreme
Court determined the "constitutional [protections for speech and press] require
.. a federal rule that prohibits a public official from recovering damages for a
defamatory falsehood relating to his official conduct,"'" unless he proves "actual
malice," i.e., that the statement was made "with knowledge that it was false or
with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not."'3 The difficult burden
placed upon public officials protects open, public debate concerning our
government. This protection limits the ability of public officials to recover
damages in libel suits, thereby restricting the potential liability of newspapers and
other media.
An important means of effectuating this policy is the media defendant's use
of summary judgment.' The public official plaintiff must show that he can
prove actual malice, a much heavier burden than other civil action plaintiffs must
carry. Without this heavier burden, reporters would be forced to fully litigate
libel claims, and the cost of attorney's fees alone would produce a chilling effect
9. 655 So. 2d 779 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1995).
10. 115 S. Ct. 1511 (1995).
11. 376 U.S. 254, 84 S. Ct. 710 (1964).
12. Id. at 279, 84 S. Ct. at 726.
13. Id. at 280, 84 S, Ct. at 726.
14. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 106 S. Ct. 2505 (1986).
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whereby "would-be critics of official conduct may be deterred from voicing their
criticism, even though it is believed to be true and even though it is in fact true,
because of doubt whether it can be proved in court or fear cof the expense of
having to do so."'" Therefore,
[w]hen determining if a genuine factual issue as to actual malice exists
in a libel suit brought by a public (official], a trial judge must bear in
mind Ithe actual quantum and quality of proof necessary to support
liability under [Sullivan]. For example, there is no genuine issue if the
evidence presented in the opposing affidavits is of insufficient caliber
or quantity to allow a rational finder of fact to find actual malice by
clear and convincing evidence.' 6
2. Harte-Hanks Communication, Inc. v. Connaughton-The Application
of Sullivan by The United States Supreme Court
Daniel Connaughton, a candidate for municipal judge, conducted a tape-
recorded interview of Patsy Stephens during which Stephens revealed that she
made cash payments to Billy Joe New, the Director of Court Services, to dispose
of minor criminal charges against her former husband and other relatives and
acquaintances." There were eight witnesses to the conversation. One was
Alice Thompson, Stephens' sister, and the other seven were Connaughton's
political allies. 8 New was later arrested, indicted, and conv:icted of accepting
bribes.
New's lawyer contacted the Journal News to arrange an interview with Alice
Thompson concerning the "dirty tricks" Connaughton was using in his
a pai%.' 9 Secifcall, Thompson charged that Connauqvon offered to pay
for Thompson and Stephens' Florida vacation, to buy a restaurant for their
parents, and to provide jobs for both women.20 During the interview, Thomp-
son indicated that another newspaper had refused to print her story, that the local-
police were not interested, and that she was opposed to Connaughton' selec-
tion.21 The Journal News then interviewed Connaughton who candidly
acknowledged the conversation and its contents to the reporters.2 Connaughton
stated that although the subjects mentioned by Thompson were discussed, her
IS. /~c e~espa t 1,t!161.
16. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 254, 106 S. Ct. at 2513.
17. Harte-Hanks Communication, Inc. v. Connaughton, 491 U.S. 657, 668, 109 S. Ct. 2678,
2686 (1989).
18. Id. at 660, 109 S. Ct. at 2687.
19. Id. at 670, 109 S. Ct. at 2687.
20. Id. at 671-72, 109 S. Ct. at 2687-88.
21. Id. at 673. 109 S. Ct. at 2688.
22. Id. at 676, 109 S. Ct..at 2690.
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account was "'obviously shaded and bizarre"' and "there was 'absolutely' no
'quid pro quo for information. ' '
The jury, after hearing all of the evidence, decided unanimously that the
allegations were false and that the Journal News acted with actual malice. The
Supreme Court affirmed. In doing so, the Court relied on several indicia of
actual malice. First, the managing editor of the Journal News instructed
reporters to interview all witnesses to the conversation between Connaughton and
Thompson except Patsy Stephens, her sister." The Court stated:
it is utterly bewildering in light of the fact that the Journal News
committed substantial resources to investigating Thompson's claims, yet
chose not to interview the one witness who was most likely to confirm
Thompson's account of the events. However, if the Journal News had
serious doubts concerning the truth of Thompson's remarks, but was
committed to running the story, there was good reason not to interview
Stephens-while denials coming from Connaughton's supporters might
be explained as motivated by a desire to assist Connaughton, a denial
coming from Stephens would quickly put an end to the story.25
Second, "[tihe newspaper's decision not to listen to the tapes of the Stephens
interview in Connaughton's home also supports the finding of actual malice."26
Connaughton made the tapes available, and Thompson's rendition of the
conversation could have been dispelled by listening to the tapesY
B. The Louisiana Approach-Tarpley v. Colfax Chronicle
On February 11, 1993, the Colfax Chronicle published an anonymous letter
to the editor concerning the conduct of Mr. Tarpley, the district attorney:
A few more statistics on Mr. Tarpley need examining. Mr. Tarpley
knows that meetings of the school board an hour before the regular
meeting to discuss business and make decisions is a violation of the law
he was sworn to uphold. To make it even worse, Mr. Tarpley attended
these meetings. Not only were decisions made, but they were carried
out and never voted on in open meetings. To me, this hinges on
malfeasance."
Prior to printing this letter to the editor, the Colfax Chronicle had printed copies
of plea agreements and accused the district attorney of "[coddling] criminals and
23. Id. a1 677, 109 S. Ct. at 2690.
24. Id. at 682, 109 S. CL at 2693.
25. Id., 109 S. Ct. at 2693.
26. id. at 683, 109 S. Ct. at 2693.
27. Id.
28. Tarpley v. Colfax Chronicle, 649 So. 2d 469, 470 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1994).
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their attorneys" and of "wheeling and dealing" in court. The Colfax Chronicle
also alleged that Mr. Tarpley lacked "due diligence" in his litigation of a DWI
case, printed cartoons suggesting he was lax in prosecuting homicides and printed
editorials criticizing his performance as the district attorney.29 After reading the
'kst a\\egio e& rym sps,, Mi. w tt , &t Colfax Chronicle to
request an apology and the name of his accuser. The Chronicle printed his
request and this response:
Dear Mr. Tarpley, For 117 years, the people of this parish have trusted
this newspaper. We do not betray the trust of anyone, for any reason.
You will not intimidate us with childish threats of lawsuits. For the
record, we will not reveal the author of the above mentioned letter, not
today, not next week, not ever.30
In an, effort to oust the district attorney, the Chronicle printed a recall
petition and urged its readers to circulate the petition among local citizens. The
t& T Pt,%. d , ad ~t , of t,vt, m,3,a, i tht 'r .- A. . t t L 'A 2a
Third Circuit Court of Appeal put it, "[t]he record leaves no doubt that Mrs.
Richards [the editor] and the Colfax Chronicle were not particularly fond of Mr.
Tarpley."3' The district court granted the Colfax Chronicle's motion for
summary judgment. Upon its review of this evidence, the court of appeal
reversed. The Louisiana Supreme Court, however, reversed the court of appeal
and reinstated the district court's summary judgment. 2
The supreme court's opinion reiterated the standard for summary judgment
in public official libel suits. The court, citing Mashburn v. Collin,33 stated the
evidence must show that "the alleged defamatory statements were made with
knowing and reckless falsity." 4 The Mashburn court relied on the United
States Supreme Court decision in Harte-Hanks Communication, Inc. v.
Connaughton s as authority for the standard. However, Har;!e-Hanks actually
used a different standard requiring only a showing that the statement was made
"with knowledge that the statement was false or with reckle.s disregard as to
whether or not it was true. '36 The Louisiana Supreme Court added the proviso
that "the actual malice standard is not satisfied merely through showing ill will
29. Id. at 471.
30. Id
31. Id.
32. Tarpley v. Colfax Chronicle, 650 So. 2d 738 (La. 1995).
33. 355 So. 2d 879 (1977).
34. Tarpley, 650 So. 2d at 740 (emphasis added) (citing Mashburn v. Collin, 355 So. 2d 879
(1977)).
35. 491 U.S. 657, 109 S. CL 2678 (1989).
36. Id. at 667, 109 S. Ct. at 2685 (emphasis added). As discussed infra .Part 111, the Louisiana
Supreme Court did not account for the difference in the language, but this diffcrence may reflect the




or 'malice' in the ordinary sense of the word."" To prove reckless disregard
for the truth, the plaintiff "must show that the false publication was made with
a 'high degree of awareness of probable falsity' or the defendant 'entertained
serious doubt as to the truth of his publication.""'3 Without discussing in what
way the evidence failed to establish that Mr. 'Tarpley would be able to meet tWis
burden, the supreme court reinstated the district court's summary judgment.
In the Harte-Hanks decision, the United States Supreme Court stated "failure
to investigate before publishing, even when a reasonably prudent person would
have done so, is not sufficient to establish reckless disregard."'39 However, the
Court allowed circumstantial evidence showing the defendant's state of mind and
motive to be considered in the actual malice inquiry.' Thus, while the Court
established that neither a newspaper's motive nor its failure to investigate
supports a finding of actual malice, it suggested a combination of these two
factors-a showing of a newspaper's motive to injure and a newspaper's failure
to investigate a claim (particularly one easily disproved)-may suffice to find
actuail malice. is earlier discussed, in Harte-Hanks, thte United States Supreme
Court found the evidence sufficient to support a finding of actual malice.
C. Differences Between Harte-Hanks and Tarpley
A significant difference between Harte-Hanks and Tarpley is each
defendant's knowledge of its source's credibility. In Harte-Hanks, the source's
credibility was questionable from the start. Thompson admitted that her story
had been turned down by another newspaper and that the police were not
interested." In Tarpley, however, the editor testified "she had known the
author of the published letter for approximately thirty-five years and considered
him to be very credible."4 While this difference would probably not relieve
the Colfax Chronicle from ultimate liability under federal precedent,43 it may
have made a difference in the summary judgment proceedings. Perhaps, in a
fully litigated trial the jury would have found that the editor's assertion was, in
fact, true and that she acted without "actual malice." However, in the motion for
surnmary judgment, the editor's knowledge of her source's credibility, in light
of all the facts, would probably be insufficient to support a motion for summary
judgment under the federal standard. Under Harte-Hanks, the United States
37. Tarpley, 650 So. 2d at 740.
38. Id. at 740 (quoting Harte-Hanks Communication, Inc. v. Connaughton, 491 U.S. 657, 667,
109 S. Ct. 2678, 2686 (1989)).
39. Harte-Hanks, 491 U.S. at 688, 109 S. Ct. at 2696.
40. Id. at 668, 109 S. Ct. at 2686.
41. Id. at 673, 109 S. Ct. at 2688.
42. Tarpley v. Colfax Chronicle, 649 So. 2d 469, 471 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1994).
43. See e.g., Harte-Hanks Communication, Inc. v. Cannaughton, 491 U.S. 657, 109 S. Ct. 2678
(1989), Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 106 S. Ct. 2505 (1986).
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Supreme Court probably would have upheld the Louisiana Third Circuit's
reversal of summary judgment in Tarpley.
One might differentiate between the two cases on the ground that Tarpley
concerned the newspaper's decision to publish the sentiments of a third party,
whereas in Harte-Hanks 1he newspaper pubbsned its report based upon its own
investigation. This difference, however, does not seem significant considering
both newspapers' published allegations of a public official's illegal conduct. In
Tarpley, the Colfax Chronicle did no investigation, and in Harle-Hanks, the
investigation the Journal News undertook was deemed insufficient. The intent
to injure a public official motivated both media defendants.
Examining the facts of Harte-Hanks and Tarpley arid comparing the
reasoning of the United States Supreme Court and the Louisiana Supreme Court
reveal that the summary judgment hurdle is higher under Louisiana precedent
than its federal counterpart.
The next section examines the reasoning of the Louisiaina Fourth Circuit
Court of Appeal in State v. Moses. " As demonstrated by the fourth circuit's
treatment of the Louisiana legislature's attempt to ban anonymous campaign
literature, an explanation of the higher summary judgment standard in Louisiana
may be that the Louisiana Constitution, as interpreted by the: Louisiana courts,
provides greater protection of free speech.
Ill. LEGISLATIVE BANS ON ANONYMOUS CAMPAIGN LITERATURE
The District of Columbia and all but two of the United States currently have
statutes requiring disclosure of some party's identity on campaign literature."5
Intermittently, Louisiana has been one of the states with such a statute. When
the Louisiana Fourth Circuit decided State v. Moses,' it broke Louisiana away
from the mainstream. Two predecessors of the statute found unconstitutional in
Moses were also struck down in 1976 and 1989 by the Louisiana Supreme
Court,47 indicating that the Louisiana legislature has attempted to maintain such
a statute in spite of its repeated defeats in the courts.
In Moses, Napoleon Moses was indicted for violating Louisiana Revised
Statutes 18:1463(C)(3) which states, in pertinent part, "if an individual ... is
responsible for or causes the distribution or transmission of any statements
relative to candidates or propositions, there shall be included thereon the name
of the individual ... and whether or not such individual ... supports or opposes
such candidate or proposition."" Moses violated this statute when he
distributed campaign literature which did not include the name and address of the
44. 655 So. 2d 779 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1995).
45. Erika King, Anonymous Campaign Literature and the First Amendkient. 21 N.C. Cent. L.J.
144 (1995).
46. 655 So, 2d 779 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1995).
47. State v. Fulton, 337 So. 2d 866 (La. 1976); State v. Burgess. 543 So. 2d 1332 (La. 1989).
48. La. R.S. 18:1463(CX3) (Supp. 1996).
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person responsible for its contents. Moses was not charged with a violation of
Louisiana Revised Statutes 18:1463(C)(1) which prohibits the distribution of any
literature "containing any statement which (the distributor] knows or should be
reasonably expected to know makes a false statement about a candidate for
election in a primary or general election or about a proposition to be submitted
to the voters.' 49 The constitutional controversy created by subsection (C)(3)
stems from the fact that it prohibits all anonymous campaign literature, not
simply anonymous campaign literature containing false statements.
The Fourth Circuit's opinion in Moses relied on the recent United States
Supreme Court decision in McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Commission5  and on the
greater protection provided for speech and privacy through Louisiana Constitu-
tion article 1, sections 5 and 7.5' The fourth circuit questioned why candidates
and issues (or propositions) should receive protection against false statements via
statutory sanctions while elected, public officials receive no statutory protection
or any civil remedy for such false statements unless they meet the nearly
ia~wo12b1t "actual malice' standard of the comn law defa nation action.
The United States Supreme Court seems willing to place heightened importance
upon the state's interest in preventing fraud and libel "during election campaigns
when false statements, if credited, may have serious adverse consequences for
the public at large." 52 But, the Court does not offer the same level of protec-
tion to officials once they are elected, instead requiring them to overcome the
actual malice standard.
53
Why is the public at large more susceptible to adverse consequences during
an election than they are at other times? Two distinctions support this different
treatment. First, candidates only have a limited amount of time available before
the election to refute the false statements. Second, an elected official presumably
has significantly greater access to the media for an effective refutation.
A. McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Commission
In McIntyre,s' the United States Supreme Court considered a challenge to
Ohio's longstanding statute prohibiting the distribution of anonymous campaign
literature.55 Mrs. McIntyre distributed anonymous leaflets expressing her
49. La. R.S. 18:1463(CXI) (Supp. 1996).
50. 115 S. CL 1511 (1995) (holding unconstitutional an Ohio law prohibiting the distribution
of anonymous campaign literature),
51. "We find that article I, Section 7, Freedom of Expression, of the Louisiana Constitution
'wim combined with art1zct t, Sec taon 5, Rigt to Privacy, affords stronger protection for anonymity
in Louisiana than can be found in the U.S. Constitution." Moses, 655 So. 2d at 784.
52. McIntyre, 115 S. Ct. at 1520.
53. See Harte-Hanks Communications, Inc. v. Connaughton, 491 U.S. 657, 109 S. Ct. 2678
(1989).
54. 115 S. Ct. 1511 (1995).
55. Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 3599.09(A) (Anderson 1988). The statute was originally enacted




opposition to a school tax levy. 6 A complaint was filed with the Ohio
Elections Commission who found she had violated Section 3599.09(A) of the
Ohio Code57 which states in pertinent part:
No person shall write, print, post, or distribute, or cause to be written,
printed, posted, or distributed, a notice, placard, dodger, advertisement,
sample ballot, or any other form of general publication which is
designed to promote the nomination or election or defeat of a candidate,
or to promote the adoption or defeat of any issue, or to influence the
voters in any election ... unless there appears on such form of
publication in a conspicuous place or is contained within said statement
the name and residence or business address of... the person who
issues, makes, or is responsible therefor."8
The Commision imposed a fine of $100.5'
The Court was quick to point out, as in Moses, "there [was] no suggestion
that the text of her message voas false, misltading, or 1ibelous. "6 The Court
found that the Ohio statute could be used to punish an "offender" who distributed
anonymous campaign literature that: (1) was true; (2) concerned a ballot issue
rather than a candidate for political office; and (3) was printed and distributed
at a very low cost, on a small scale by a private individual."' Justice Stevens'
opinion for the Court rested its decision on the First Amendment protection of
freedom of speech.
The Court first noted the historical significance of anonymity in literature:
"Whatever the motivation may be, at least in the field of literary endeavor, the
interest in having anonymous works enter the marketplace of ideas unquestion-
ably outweighs any public interest in requiring disclosure ets a condition of
entry."'' The court stressed the importance of anonymity in the political arena
with powerful examples-reminding us of England's press licensing laws,
seditious libel prosecutions, and the fact that "even the argumrents favoring the
ratification of the Constitution advanced in the Federalist Papers were published
under fictitious names."63 Justice Stevens quoted Justice Black's decision in
Talley v. California' noting "(p]ersecuted groups and sects from time to time
throughout history have been able to criticize oppressive practices and laws either
anonymously or not at all."'"
56. McIntyre, 115 S. Ct. at 1514.
57. Id. at 1514.
58. Oh1io Rev. Code Ann. § 3599.09(A) (Anderson 1988).
59. McIntyre, 115 S. Ct. at 1514.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 1521.
62. Id. at 1516.
63. Id. at 1517 (citing Talley v. California, 362 U.S. 60, 64-65, 80 S. Ct 536, 538-39 (1960)).
64. 362 U.S. 60, 80 S. Ct. 536 (1960).
65. Mcantyre, 115 S. Ct. at 1516.
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The Court then shifted its attention to Ohio's argument that this statute does
not regulate such types of speech but only "unsigned documents designed to
influence voters in an election." 66 Ohio argued the statute should be treated
simply as an election code provision governing the voting process, not one
governing speech.' The Court rejected this argument and found that the Ohio
statute does not regulate the mechanics of the electoral process but regulates "pure
speech." The Court concluded that the statute restricted political speech based
on content, and as a content-based restriction on political expression, subjected the
statute to "exacting scrutiny."69 Under the rigors of "exacting scrutiny," the Court
viewed Mrs. McIntyre's leaflet as "the essence of First Amendment expression.""'
Once the Court determined that the leaflet was protected by the First
Amendment, it considered whether the statute was "narrowly tailored to serve an
overriding state interest."7 Ohio asserted an interest in preventing fraudulent
and libelous statements and in providing the electorate with relevant informa-
tion." The Court dismissed the interest in providing the electorate with
relevant information as insufficient. Justice Stevens stated:
Insofar as the interest in informing the electorate means nothing more
than the provision of additional information that may either buttress or
undermine the argument in a document,.. . the identity of the speaker
is no different from other components of the document's content that
the author is free to include or exclude.73
Further, the author's name and address do not aid the reader in evaluating the
message.7
The Court recognized that Ohio did have a valid interest in preventing fraud
and libel, and that the statute both aided the enforcement of the statutory
prohibition against the dissemination of false information and deterred the
making of false statements." However, the Court held the means this statute
employed, namely the prohibition of all anonymous literature relating to
elections, was unconstitutionally overbroad. The statute applied to candidates as
well as individuals. It applied to elections of public officers as well as to ballot
issues "that present neither a substantial risk of libel nor any potential appearance
of corrupt advantage." 76 It applied to leaflets distributed on the eve of an
66. Id. at 1517.
67. Id. at 1518.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 1518.




74. Id. at 1520.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 1521.
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election as well as those distributed months in advance." It applied regardless
of the character or strength of the author's interest in anonymity and to true and
accurate documents.7 ' Further, the Court noted that the statute was not well
tailored for its purpose since Ohio could not use it to prevent the distribution of
fliers with false names and addresses printed on them. 9  Justice Stevens did
specifically recognize that a more limited identification requirement may be
justified by a state's enforcement interest8s
B. State v. Moses-Protection Under the Louisiana Constitution
The Louisiana Fourth Circuit Court of Appeal believed McIntyre controlled
its decision. However, the court of appeal analyzed the Louisiana statute under
the Louisiana Constitution and found that anonymity in the realm of political
speech is afforded greater protection by the Louisiana Constitution than by the
United States Constitution.8" After noting the Louisiana Supreme Court's
reasoning in the prior decisions striking down the predecessors of Louisiana
Revised Statutes 18:1463(C)(3),"2 the fourth circuit compared the language of
the First Amendment to the United States Constitution 3 and Louisiana
77. Id.
78. Id. at 1522.
79. Id.
80. Id. (Justice Thomas' concurrence rejected the reasoning of the majority and focused on the
original understanding of the phrase "freedom of speech, or of the press." 115 S. Ct. at 1524
(Thomas, J., concurring). He looked closely at the Revolutionary and Ratification periods and
concluded "the historical evidence indicates that Founding-era Americans opposed attempts to require
that anonymous authors reveal their identities on the ground that forced disclosure violated the
*freedom of the press."' 115 S. Ct. at 1526 (Thomas. ., concurring). Therefore, anonymity, in the
context here involved, is protected under the First Amendment. Justice Scalia, joined by Justice
Rehnquist, dissented. He rejected what he considered the majority's "hitherto wdcnown right-to-be-
unknown while engaging in electoral politics." 115 S. Ct. at 1531 (Scalia, J., dissenting). He also
rejected the findings of Justice Thomas and opined "there probably never arose even the abstract
question of whether electoral openness and regularity was worth such a governmental restriction upon
the normal right to anonymous speech" since "It]he idea of close government regulation of the
electoral process is a more modem phenomenon, arriving in this country in thei late 1800's." 115
S. Ct. at 1532 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia believed that the "widespread and longstanding
traditions of our people," evidenced by laws stretching back to 1890 and encompassing every state
except California, afford a very strong presumption of constitutionality to the statute at issue. 115
S. Ct. at 1532.33 (Scalia, I., dissenting) (It is interesting to note that Justice Clark's dissent in Talley
assumed the constitutional validity of the Ohio (and other states) statute at issue in this case was
obvious. Talley v. California, 362 U.S. 60, 70, 80 S. Ct. 536, 542 (1960)). He: concluded "[sluch
a universal and long established American legislative practice must be given precedence ... over
historical and academic speculation regarding a restriction that assuredly does not go to the heart of
free speech." 115 S. Ct. 1533 (Scalia, J., dissenting)).
81. State v. Moses, 655 So. 2d 779 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1995).
82. State v. Burgess, 543 So. 2d 1332 (La. 1989); State v. Fulton, 337 So. 2d 866 (La. 1976).
83. Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free
exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people
peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievanes.
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Constitution article 1, sections 5 and 7." The fourth circuit asserted that the
following language from the Louisiana Constitution provides greater protection
to anonymous speech:
Every person shall be secure in his person, property, communications,
houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches, seizures, or
invasions of privacy. No warrant shall issue without probable cause
supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place
to be searched, the persons or things to be seized, and the lawful
purpose or reason for the search. Any person adversely affected by a
search or seizure conducted in violation of this Section shall have
standing to raise its illegality in the appropriate court.85
No law shall curtail or restrain the freedom of speech or of the press.
Every person may speak, write, and publish his sentiments on any
subject, but is responsible for abuse of that freedom. 6
While McIntyre concerned the distribution of materials relating to a ballot issue,
Moses concerned the distribution of materials relating to a candidate for public
office. Justice Stevens relied on the fact that the Ohio statute applied "not only
to elections of public officers, but also to ballot issues that present neither a
substantial risk of libel nor any potential appearance of corrupt advantage"8 7 as
one reason for its overbreadth. Arguably, a statute which prohibits anonymous
speech about a candidate seeking election would be less broad and perhaps
Constitutional. The Louisiana Fourth Circuit rejected that possibility and used
the Louisiana Constitution for support. Based on the greater protection of
privacy provided by reading Louisiana Constitution article 1, sections 5 and 7 in
conjunction, the fourth circuit held the statute's prohibition of anonymous speech
unconstitutional under the Louisiana Constitution.
The fourth circuit analogized a defamation suit by a private citizen to the
presumed protection the statute provided for candidates and elected officials.
The court stated that it is contrary to the spirit of both the United States and
Louisiana Constitutions to afford special defamation protections to a public
official or candidate (by providing the name of the individual making the
statement), while a private individual in a defamation action has the burden of
proving who made the statement.88 The court's analogy is problematic because
it assumes that the purpose of the statute is to provide the candidate or elected
official with the identity of the person making the statement so that he may bring
a civil defamation action. However, the statute itself imposes a penalty on the
84. State v. Moses, 655 So. 2d 779, 784 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1995).
85. La. Conast. art. 1, § 5.
86. La. Const. art. 1, § 7.
87. McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n, 115 S. Ct. 1511, 1521 (1995).
88. State v. Moses, 655 So. 2d 779, 784-85 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1995).
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violator. It does not provide for a civil action by the candidate, and arguably,
it is the purpose of the statute to protect the election and not the candidates.
This analogy also fails to account for the heightened level of importance the
United States Supreme Court was willing to afford the state in the area of
elections.
The underlying rationale for the fourth circuit's opinion, that the citizens of
Louisiana decided to "give a 'higher standard of individual liberty than that
afforded by the jurisprudence interpreting the federal constitution,' 9 supports
its decision that the statute is unconstitutional in violation of the Louisiana
Constitution. That the Louisiana statute is also a ban on all anonymous speech
relating to elections of candidates and ballot issues would likely prompt the
United States Supreme Court to strike it down as overbroad and thus violative
of the First Amendment to the United States Constitution.
In Moses, the fourth circuit stated "that article I, Section 7, Freedom of
Expression, of the Louisiana Constitution when combined with article 1, Section
5, Right to Privacy, affords stronger protection for anonymity in. Louisiana than
can be found in the U.S. Constitution."" To support its conclusion, the court
quoted its decision, State v. Daniels:
Louisiana enjoys the distinction of having a specifically denominated
and defined constitutional right to privacy. The Louisiana Supreme
Court recognized that: "Article 1, Section 5, of the Louisiana Constitu-
tion of 1974 protects against unreasonable searches, seizures and
invasions of privacy. This declaration of rights does not duplicate the
Fourth Amendment [to the United States Constitution]. It represents a
conscious choice by the citizens of Louisiana to give a 'higher standard
of individual liberty than that afforded by the jurisprudence interpreting
the federal constitution.""'
IV. AN ANALYSIS OF LOUISIANA CONSTITUTION ARTICLE 1, SECTIONS 5
AND 7
Louisiana Constitution article I, section 7 states that "[n]o law shall curtail
or restrain the freedom of speech or of the press."92 This language tracks that
of the United States Constitution Amendment I with one exception. The United
States Constitution states "Congress shall make no law ... abridging the
freedom of speech, or of the press. '  The Louisiana Constitution, however,
89. Id. at 785 (quoting State v. Daniels, 631 So. 2d 1281, 1283 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1994)
(quoting State v. Hernandez, 410 So. 2d 1381, 1385 (La. 1982))).
90. Masei, 655 So. 2d at 784.
91. 631 So. 2d at 1283 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1994) (quoting State v. Hemande, 410 So. 2d 1381,
1385 (La. 1982) (quoting State v. Church, 538 So. 2d 993 (La. 1989))).
92. La. Const. art. 1, § 7.
93. U.S. Const. amend. I.
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uses the words "curtail" and "restrain" rather than abridge. Abridge is
synonymous with curtail," but the choice of curtail may reflect a decision to
reject the jurisprudence concerning the United States Constitution in favor of
more stringent protection of speech. This is bolstered by the use of the
disjunctive "or" followed by "restrain." Restrain may be defined as "to hold
back from some course of action, keep in check, repress." 5
The aggregate of many libel suits against the media may certainly repress
or restrain the freedom of speech for individuals who wish to speak out but are
afraid of reprisal. This restraint may be alleviated by the stringent application
of the "actual malice" standard as evidenced by the Louisiana Supreme Court's
opinion in Tarpley. Louisiana Revised Statutes 18:1463(C)(3) represented a law
that directly curtailed and restrained freedom of speech. It completely eliminated
one type of speech by prohibiting the distribution of campaign literature unless
it contained information deemed necessary by the state (the author's name,
address, and whether he supports or opposes the candidate or proposition) and
was, therefore, unconstitutional.
The second sentence of Louisiana Constitution article 1, section 7 states that
"[e]very person may speak, write, and publish his sentiments on any subject."' 6
This language is not simply a negative restriction on the power of the state like
the first sentence, but is positive language reaffirming the freedoms reserved by
the people. The first and second sentences read together go further to protect the
freedom of speech and of the press than does the United States Constitution
Amendment I which is only a negative restriction on the government's ability to
limit speech.
Louisiana Constitution article 1, section 5 states in pertinent part that
"[e]very person shall be secure in his ... communications ... against
unreasonable searches, seizures, or invasions of privacy."9 Communications
may be defined as "the imparting, conveying, or exchange of ideas, knowledge,
information, etc. (whether by speech, writing, or signs)."'9 Privacy may be
defined as "the state or condition of being alone, undisturbed, or free from public
attention, as a matter of choice or right."" In State v. Hernandez, the Louisiana
Supreme Court explained that:
Our state constitution's declaration of the right to privacy contains an
affirmative establishment of a right of privacy, explicit protections against
unreasonable searches, seizures or invasions of property and communica-
tions, as well as houses, papers and effects, and gives standing to any
person adversely affected by a violation of these safeguards to raise the
94. 1 Oxford English Dictionary 43 (2d. Ed. 1989).
95. XIII id. at 756-57.
96. La. Coast. on. I, § 7.
97. La. Const. art. 1, § 5.
98. I1 Oxford English Dictionary 578 (2d Ed. 1989).
99. XII Id. at 515.
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illegality in the courts. This constitutional declaration of right is not a
duplicate of the Fourth Amendment or merely coextensive with it; it is one
of the most conspicuous instances in which our citizens have chosen a
higher standard of individual liberty than that afforded by the jurispru-
dence interpreting the federal constitution.'l°
To protect the privacy of an individual's communications, the state must protect a
newspaper's ability to print certain material without publicizing the name of the
individual who wishes to remain anonymous.'0 ' If liability is imposed on
newspapers for agreeing to such protection, then the mechanism for an individual
to speak out without his communications leading to his own unwanted publicity is
curtailed. Thus, the right for one's communications to be secure against unreason-
able invasions of privacy strengthens the reasoning for a very stringent application
of the "actual malice" standard. Louisiana Revised Stautes 18: !163(C)(3) was a
direct infringement against the right of one's communication to be free from
unreasonable invasions of privacy. The mechanism of printing one's beliefs, ideas
or other information anonymously to avoid publicity would be eliminated by this
statute. It thus directly conflicted with the Louisiana Constitution.
Combining the negative restriction on the ability of the slate to limit the
freedom of speech and the press and the reaffirmation of these freedoms reserved
by the people contained in Article 1, section 7, and the requirement that individuals'
communications be free from unreasonable invasions of privacy contained in
Article 1, section 5 leads to an almost absolute protection for anonymous speech.
The one limitation on that freedom is the last clause of Article 1, section 7 which
makes an individual "responsible for abuse of that freedom."'0" How may one
abuse the freedom of speech and the press? Abuse may be defined as "improper
use, injurious speech, perversion."'0 3 Couched in such absolute terms, the Louisi-
ana Constitution's protection of freedom of speech, press, and security in one's
communications from invasions of privacy seems to require a misuse of those
freedoms which would pervert them in order to rise to the level of abuse. Merely
making false statements in a public forum does not seem to rise to the level of a
perversion of these freedoms.
The "actual malice" standard for public official libel suits, in its Tarpley
application, serves well the constitutional mandate of protection for the freedom
of speech. There is room for the court to find that there has, in fact, been an
abuse of that freedom, but such a finding requires a showing cf "knowing and
100. State v. Hemandez, 410 So. 2d 1381, 1385 (La. 1982).
101. For a case in which the Louisiana Supreme Court placed greater emphasis on the freedom
of the press to publish even where the privacy of several individuals was ostensibly invaded by the
publication, see Roshto v. Hebert, 439 So. 2d 428 (La. 1983). It would seem that the court would
most fervently protect both the freedom of the press and an individual's privacy if both were
jeopardized by a libel action.
102. La. Const. art. I, § 7.
103. 1 Oxford English Dictionary 59 (2d Ed. 1989).
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reckless falsity." The individual must know that the information he is dissemi-
nating is false and must know that the dissemination of such false information
is reckless in that it perverts the exercise of the freedoms granted in the
Louisiana Constitution.
An argument for the constitutionality of Louisiana Revised Statutes
18:1463(C)(3) seems to be its use in enforcing the constitutional requirement that
individual's be responsible for abuse of their freedom of speech and the press.
However, as discussed previously, banning entire categories of political speech
is clearly not constitutionally permissible, It is not possible for there to be a
misuse of the freedom of speech that rises to the level of perverting that freedom
when there has not even been an exercise of that freedom.
V. CONCLUSION
The protection of the freedom of speech, press, and security in one's
communications from invasions of privacy embodied in the Louisiana Constitu-
tion goes further to protect those freedoms than does the United States
Constitution. This was reflected in the Louisiana Supreme Court's decision in
Tarpley in which the United States Constitution perhaps would not have
protected these freedoms. It was reflected in the Louisiana Fourth Circuit Court
of Appeal decision in Moses by the court's choice not to rest its decision solely
on the interpretation given the United States Constitution by the United States
Supreme Court, but on the rigid protection of these freedoms found in the
Louisiana Constitution. If these decisions reflect a trend in Louisiana courts'
willingness to rely on the Louisiana Constitution for protection of the freedom
of speech, the press, and the right to privacy, then Louisianians may look
forward to increasingly unfettered political discussion and debate.
Bradford Hyde Felder
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